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The standard view of academic freedom and free speech is that they play comple-
mentary roles in universities. Academic freedom protects academic discourse,
while other public discourse in universities is protected by free speech. Here I
challenge this view, broadly, on the grounds that free speech in universities some-
times undermines academic practices. One defense of the standard view, in the
face of this worry, says that campus free speech actually furthers the university’s
academic aims. Another says that universities have a secondary democratic func-
tion, which cannot be fulfilled without free speech on campus. I identify short-
comings in both types of arguments.I. INTRODUCTION
People sometimes talk as if “academic freedom” simplymeans something
like “free speech as applied in academic settings.” This understanding is
often evident in popular discourse, and sometimes in scholarly writing
too. However, most sophisticated scholarship on this topic nowadays rec-
ognizes that academic freedom is importantly distinct from free speech—
that it is not aptly construed as just “part of the ordinary freedom that* For valuable feedback and criticism, I thank two anonymous reviewers and several
anonymous editors at Ethics, as well as Eric Barendt, AdamDean, Toby Handfield, Jeff How-
ard, Kasim Khorasanee, Brian Leiter, George Letsas, Saladin Meckled-Garcia, Polly Mitch-
ell, Crescente Molina, Scott Shapiro, and audiences at the UCL Law School, Queen Mary
University, the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group, the University of Tartu, and the
University of Warwick. I’m also grateful to Amia Srinivasan; some of the ideas in this article
evolved out of an earlier article we coauthored entitled “No Platforming.”
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288 Ethics April 2020is the birthright of citizens in a democracy.”1 Most scholarly writing on
academic freedom adopts a more nuanced—and at first blush, more
plausible—view about the relation between academic freedom and free
speech. I will call this more nuanced, plausible view the standard view. It
is captured in remarks like the following, first from Erwin Chemerinsky
and Howard Gillman: “We should think of campuses as having two dif-
ferent zones of free expression: a professional zone, which protects the ex-
pression of ideas but imposes an obligation of responsible discourse and
responsible conduct in formal educational and scholarly settings; and a
larger free speech zone . . . where the only restrictions are those of society
at large. Members of the campus community may say things in the free
speech zones that they would not be allowed to say in the core educational







ton, NThe ideal of academic freedom emphasizes that members of the
faculty should have the independence to exercise their professional
judgment and not be constrained by social, political, or financial
pressures. . . . But the campus is home to more than the work of
scholars. Universities have long offered an arena in which students
and visitors engage with and advocate for ideas. Those debates are
often boisterous and freewheeling. They reflect the chaos of Ameri-
can democracy rather than the decorum of the seminar room. What
holds those two worlds together is a common commitment to taking
ideas seriously, to exploring the unconventional . . . and to holding
accepted truths up for challenge and reconsideration.3In sum, academic freedom and free speech are importantly distinct, but
both kinds of freedom have important—and complementary—roles to
play in the university’s organization and governance. The university is a
venue for overtly academic communicative activities, related to teaching
and research, and these are to be protected by academic freedom. But it
also plays host to other kinds of communicative activities, including com-
mencement addresses, public lectures and debates, student society meet-
ings, protest, political advocacy, and student journalism. These commu-
nicative activities should be supported, accommodated, and protected
against content-based restrictions under the auspices of free speech.. David Bromwich, “Academic Freedom and Its Opponents,” in Who’s Afraid of Aca-
Freedom?, ed. Akeel Bilgrami and Jonathan R. Cole (New York: Columbia University
2015), 27–39, 39.
. Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, Free Speech on Campus (New Haven, CT:
niversity Press, 2017), 77; emphasis in the original.
. Keith E. Whittington, Speak Freely: Why Universities Must Defend Free Speech (Prince-
J: Princeton University Press, 2018), 7.
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dom and free speech. Specifically, I claim that the arguments that are or
may be given on behalf of this standard view are unpersuasive. We have
good reasons to uphold free speech as a basic civil liberty and good rea-
sons to accept academic freedom as a governing principle in universities.
But we do not have particularly good reasons, I will argue, for thinking of
the university as a special venue for extra-academic speech, or for making
that extra-academic speech immune to content-based restrictions, as if it
were just another form of free-speech-protected public discourse. Aca-
demic discourse is meant to be free from ideological constraints—this is
part of what academic freedom is there to ensure—but it may be, and in-
deed should be, subject to content-based restrictions, insofar as they are
driven by a concern for intellectual quality and integrity. Content-based
restrictions on speech, which are anathema to a free speech ethic, are thus
an integral part of serious academic practice. And it is in keeping with a
reasonable understanding of the university’s proper social-political func-
tion, I will argue, forus to extendanacademic communicative ethos across
the whole campus. Universities can be run as discriminating, intellectu-
ally regimented discursive arenas. We are not obliged to turn universities
into totally wide-open marketplaces of ideas.
Authors like Chemerinsky, Gillman, and Whittington believe that
this is a seriously mistaken attitude, and their worries are shared not only
by scholars but also by a broad public. Since the cultural transformations
to the university sector brought about by student protest movements of
the 1960s, most people who have anything to do with universities—aca-
demics, students, managers, and worried onlookers—have subscribed to
some version of the standard view. My question here is whether this is the
right view of things, not just as a matter of legal or institutional policy, in
any given jurisdiction, but in virtue of some deeper, philosophical idea
about what the university is supposed to be and do.
In Section II, I motivate this inquiry by expanding on the theses
briefly sketched above. Following Robert Post, I argue that an aversion to
content-based speech regulation, which is a central tenet of free speech,
is at odds with the practices of content-based discrimination that are in-
tegral to academic practice. In light of this tension, as well as a further the-
sis about the relation between a university’s institutional culture and the
pursuit of its intellectual mission, I challenge the idea that universities
have some kind of constitutive commitment to free speech.
In Sections III and IV, I examine two kinds of arguments that may
be offered in response to this challenge. The first appeals to epistemic
concerns. It says that the university’s core epistemic purposes will be bet-
ter served if the relatively disciplined communicative activities that occur
in teaching and research settings are surrounded by a less regimented,
more freewheeling communicative atmosphere on the wider campus.
290 Ethics April 2020The second kind of argument appeals to democratic concerns. It says that
universities, in addition to their epistemic mission, have a key role to play
in affirming,modeling, and nurturing a democratic ethos. In order to carry
out their role in supporting democracy, so the argument goes, universities
need to embrace a campus free speech culture. I will criticize both kinds
of arguments, and in doing so, I will defend an alternative way of thinking
about the university and its communicative ideals.My proposal is compat-
ible with a liberal politics, but it understands the university as an institu-
tion narrowly defined by its epistemic aims, rather than a theater for the
enactment of civil liberties.
II. TWO IDEAS OF A UNIVERSITY
A. Differences between Academic Freedom and Free Speech
In order to see how the tensions between academic freedom and free
speech can arise, we first need a working sense of what both sets of prin-
ciples consist of. Let’s begin with free speech. A free speech principle is “a
principle under which speech is entitled to special protection from reg-
ulation or suppression.”4 What does “special protection” mean, exactly?
First, it means protection that extends beyond the normal immunities
which, in a liberal society, are presumptively afforded to all conduct, ver-
bal or otherwise. Policies adopted for the sake of some social goal “must
provide a stronger justification when the attainment of that goal requires
the restriction of speech than when no limitations on speech are em-
ployed.”5 Second, “special protection,” in this context, means that poli-
cies which suppress speech cannot be defended via an appeal to the claim
that the ideas being suppressed are bad, wrong, offensive, or false. To up-
hold free speech is to have an “aversion to regulation on the basis of the
content of the communication.”6 This aversion partly stems from “distrust
of the ability of government to distinguish between the true and the false,
the useful and the useless, the valuable and the worthless.”7 But it runs
deeper than that. A free speech principle, as widely understood, does not
merely forbid censorship by the state. It enjoins the creation andmainte-
nance of a free speech culture, in which all are encouraged to speak their
minds and to work through their disagreements in debate and discus-
sion, instead of trying to silence or ostracize opponents.
Principles of academic freedom superficially resemble free speech
principles. They require special protection for (certain forms of) com-
municative conduct, and they oppose (certain forms of) content-based4. Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6.
5. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1982), 7–8.
6. Ibid., 101.
7. Ibid., 101.
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ademic freedom applies to a limited class of communicative activities,
coming from a limited class of speakers. It is the name we give to the set
of rights “through which professional academics may dictate, within rea-
sonable limits, the terms of their work,” including the right to “determine
the fundamental content of research and publication” and to “make im-
portant decisions about the content and terms of teaching.”8 One way of
putting this is to say that academic freedom insulates academics in their
professional conduct—insulates them against interference from govern-
ment actors, overbearing administrators in their own institutions, and ex-
ternal pressure groups.9 In essence, academic freedom has a narrower
scope of application compared to a generic free speech principle. But as
a further consequence of this elementary difference in scope, academic
freedom is also unlike a generic free speech principle in the characteris-
ticmeans throughwhich it is institutionalized. Academic freedom is char-
acteristically institutionalized through specialized contractual arrange-
ments—tenure being one notable example—which make it more difficult
for academics, compared to other professionals, to be disciplined or dis-
missed if their employers disapproveof theirmethods in carryingout their
work.10 Moreover, the profession-based nature of academic freedom also
means that the freedom it gives the academic, in her work, is bounded by
demands of professional competence. Academic freedom gives the scholar
a right to teach and research as she sees fit, but it allows that these activi-
ties, unlike public discourse, are “essentially subject to quality controls on
the basis of general professional standards of accuracy and coherence.”11
This qualifying limitation has no real analogue when it comes to the activ-
ities covered by free speech.128. Michele Moody-Adams, “What’s So Special about Academic Freedom?,” in Bilgrami
and Cole, Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom?, 97–122, 101.
9. Ronald Dworkin is one author who, in his account of academic freedom, invokes
this notion of ‘insulation’ for individual academics; see Ronald Dworkin, “We Need a New
Interpretation of Academic Freedom,” in The Future of Academic Freedom, ed. Louis Menand
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 187–98, 187.
10. For an overview of the different kinds of contractual instruments used to protect
academic freedom in universities in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany,
see Eric Barendt, Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Hart, 2010).
11. Ibid., 20. Or, as Brian Leiter says, academic freedom has definite limits, “but those
limits are to be set by those with expert competence in the relevant Wissenschaft, not by of-
fended members of the polity at large or by politicians or business leaders whose interests
might be adversely affected”; see Brian Leiter, “Why Academic Freedom?,” in The Value and
Limits of Academic Speech: Philosophical, Political, and Legal Perspectives, ed. Donald Alexander
Downs and Chris W. Surprenant (New York: Routledge, 2018), 31–46, 33.
12. The way I am defining academic freedom involves two simplifications. These are
aimed at streamlining things, and my arguments do not hinge on them, but I should note
them up front. First, academic freedom—understood in terms of the rights of the individ-
ual scholar—is often taken to protect the scholar’s speech not only in professional teach-
ing and research but also in extramural expression, e.g., commentary on political issues in
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standard view grants that academic freedom is not identical to free speech.
What it says is that these two freedoms should coexist in universities, in
a complementary fashion. But there is a further tension that makes this
coexistence more fraught than it may initially seem. Under the preroga-
tives that the scholar is afforded by her academic freedom, the scholar
needn’t—and indeed, shouldn’t—exhibit the deep-seated aversion to the
content-based regulation of ideas that is enjoined by a free speech princi-
ple. Quite the contrary: academic freedom empowers academics to regu-
late other people’s speech in a content-discriminatory way.13 Such regula-
tion is in fact integral to the form of intellectual work that the academic
performs. Robert Post offers a compelling analysis of this aspect of aca-
demic freedom. As he explains, academic work by its very nature involves
appraising the quality of other people’s ideas and arguments—how in-
formed they are, how evidentially supported, coherent, or otherwise ratio-
nally defensible, relative to some set of intellectual standards that define
the relevant discipline of inquiry—and then rewarding or amplifying the
meritorious and reproving or withholding rewards from ideas and argu-
ments that are ill-informed, incoherent, or otherwise intellectually subpar.
In institutions where academic freedom reigns, academics are protected
in performing this work and shielded against external interference in the
judgments they make to this end. And in such environments, people’s
speech will routinely be suppressed because of substantive evaluations
of its content by the domain-relevant authorities—evaluations which ig-
nore any free speech–based aspiration to content neutrality. Post sums
up this conflict in a discussion of how these broader theoretical issues play
out in the realm of American constitutional jurisprudence: “The contin-
uous discipline of peer judgment, which virtually defines expert knowl-
edge, is quite incompatible with deep and fundamental First Amend-
ment doctrines that impose a ‘requirement of viewpoint neutrality’ . . .13. Louis Menand explains one aspect of this: “Specialists within each specialized
field have wide authority to determine who the new specialists will be, and in what the work
of specialization properly consists. This authority insures a commensurately wide freedom
of inquiry; but (and this is the important point) only for the specialist. For people who do
not become members of the profession, this system constitutes not a freedom but an al-
most completely disabling restriction”; see Louis Menand, “The Limits of Academic Free-
dom,” in Menand, Future of Academic Freedom, 3–20, 8.
public forums. I will be setting extramural expression aside in what follows, apart from a
brief comment in note 28. Second, as Dworkin observes, academic freedom in fact involves
two different levels of insulation. In addition to protections for the individual academic,
there is also the insulation of each institution from governments or corporations that
might try, for example, to deter research that is contrary to their interests. At least one con-
temporary author favors a conception of academic freedom that places greater emphasis
on the latter; see Frederick Schauer, “Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?,” University of
Colorado Law Review 77 (2006): 907–28.
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disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its
content’ . . . the production of expert knowledge rests on quite different
foundations. . . . Expert knowledge requires exactly what normal First
Amendment doctrine prohibits.”14 In response to Post’s analysis, one may
argue that free speech is just about government refraining from content-
based speech regulation. Person A’s right to free speech is not infringed
if a private organization decides not to use its resources to publicize A’s
views.This is indeed thecase ifwehavea strictly legalnotionof free speech:
as a constitutional right held by individuals against the state, and nothing
more. But this is a narrow way of construing what is at stake in this area.
Thedemandsof freespeecharenotexhaustedbythedutiesassociatedwith
such a right. In the society that fully embraces free speech, the absence
of content-based legal restrictions on speech is reinforced by the private
citizen’s aversion to groupthink and socially mandated orthodoxy. The
ideal of giving every voice a hearing and the reluctance to suppress bad
ideas—regardless of how badly informed or reasoned they are—are as-
pired to by the law and the individual alike. That, at any rate, is the classi-
cal liberal ideal of free speech, in its most famous Millian form.15 It is also
what Post has inmind, andwhat those who object to “noplatforming” and
the like on free speech grounds must have in mind, at least in cases when14. Robert C. Post, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First Amendment Juris-
prudence for the Modern State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 9. For further
elaboration of his account, see Robert Post, “Academic Freedom and the Constitution,”
in Bilgrami and Cole, Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom?, 123–52; Matthew W. Finkin and
Robert C. Post, For the Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2009). On its face, Post’s claim—that academic expertise involves
imposing differential burdens on speech because of its content—may sound like an apo-
logia for dogmatism. But academic disciplines are supposed to be antidogmatic, aren’t
they? Post is not denying this. His point is about how we judge whether ideas are intellec-
tually credible within the defining parameters of an academic field. Post is not saying that
experts may suppress ideas in academic discourses merely because they dislike those ideas.
He is saying that the appraisal of ideas must follow disciplinary standards—as opposed to
majority opinion, or the diktats of the politically powerful—and that formally credentialed
disciplinary authorities are justified in applying those standards to promote credible ideas
anddemote shoddy ones. It is still the case, inprinciple, that any outlandish ideaorhypothesis
can receive a hearing in academic discourses. But again, there is a qualification: “scholarsmust
be free to debate any academically controvertedmatter, so long as the debate . . . proceeds on
the basis of scholarly standards”; see Finkin and Post, For the Common Good, 38; emphasis mine.
15. The dangers of groupthink and ideological conformity that Mill identifies in On
Liberty, and that he wants free speech to stand in guard against, are not dangers borne of
the exercise of state authority in particular. The ethical thesis that we should refrain from
suppressing disapproved ideas is meant to give rise to both a formal constraint on the
power of government and a regulative ideal for informal social intercourse among private
citizens. Indeed, at certain points Mill suggests that the latter is more important than the
former, insofar as the form of ideological conformity that comes through informal social
sanctions is more injurious to the realization of people’s individuality than the form driven
294 Ethics April 2020their objections pertain to private universities.16With thismore expansive
understanding of free speech in the background, Post’s point is that in
order to advance the university’s epistemic mission, academics should
not, in their professional work, do what a free speech ethic enjoins—they
should not exhibit an aversion to content-based speech restrictions.
So, proponents of the standard view must at least concede that the
coexistence of academic freedom and free speech in the university neces-
sitates a complex negotiation. The communicative climates in the uni-
versity’s “free speech zone” and its “professional zone”—to borrow Che-
merinsky and Gillman’s terms—are less alike than wemight have initially
supposed. When it comes to who speaks and what is said in the academic
zone, academics are empowered to decide which ideas are heard. But16. In the United States the First Amendment imposes free speech obligations on
state universities, whereas private universities are subject to such obligations only as a mat-
ter of voluntary self-regulation; see John Hasnas, “Freedom of Expression at the Private
University,” in Downs and Surprenant, Value and Limits of Academic Speech, 78–95. Onemight
argue that this is the correct approach not just as a matter of American constitutional doc-
trine but as an abstract matter of right. State universities are state institutions, and thus any
limitation on campus free speech, beyond what is strictly necessary in order for the univer-
sity to fulfill its teaching and research functions, infringes the citizen’s basic civil right to free
speech. But this line of reasoning proves too much. Any public institution, in order to be ef-
fectively managed, needs to control how its communicative platforms and resources—at its
operational premises, and under its insignia more generally—are utilized. The fact that a
state university is a public institution does not give Joe Citizen a presumptive entitlement to
speak, move, and associate however he pleases around its premises, any more than it gives
him a right to speak, move, and associate however he likes on the premises of a publically
funded arts institution or law enforcement agency. Now, one might reply that state univer-
sity campuses are not simply premises for a public institution—that they have a grander
purpose and status, qua arm of the state. I will consider some concrete arguments to this
effect in Sec. IV. My point here is that the mere fact of a state university being a public in-
stitution is not enough to show that there must be a wide-scope right to free speech on cam-
pus. Indeed, even within the parameters of the First Amendment, as applied to American
state universities, the individual’s right to free speech on campus is still subordinate to the
pursuit and realization of the university’s intellectual mission. Martha Nussbaum explains
this point as follows, quoting from Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n. 5 (1981): “The
Supreme court has explicitly said . . . ‘that students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech
and association on the campus.’ At the same time, the Court has recognized that the First
Amendment ‘must be analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment.’ A university is not like a public park: it is for education, and the Court has therefore
‘never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with
that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities’”; see Martha Nussbaum, “Civil Dis-
obedience and Free Speech in the Academy,” in Academic Freedom, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 170–85, 178.
by state action. The greater danger to human liberty, Mill suggests, comes from a social tyr-
anny “more formidable than many kinds of political oppression” since “it leaves fewer
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving
the soul itself ”; see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), in “On Liberty” and Other Essays,
ed. J. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1–128, 8–9.
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be given such control over who speaks and what is said in the free speech
zone—for example, in commencement addresses, public debates, stu-
dent society events, or the speech of student activists and journalists.
Opinions that would likely be sidelined in the academic zone—opinions
that are ill-informed, incoherent, or otherwise intellectually dubious—
should receive a hearing in these contexts, or, at any rate, they mustn’t
be denied a hearing as a result of being adjudged intellectually inferior.
Once we are outside the academic zone, academic standards should not
be used to restrict speech. As Chemerinsky andGillman say, “campuses—
public and private—must protect the freedom of the members of the
academic community to use campus grounds for the broad expression of
ideas, even if those ideas are expressed in ways that run contrary to the
norms of professional conduct that apply within classrooms, scholarly
gatherings, and department meetings.”17 And to be clear, the standard
view does not just say that it would be welcome or agreeable if universities
were to uphold free speech on campus. Rather, it regards the mainte-
nance of a free speech zone as an institutional duty that derives from
the university’s essential mission. Whittington offers some particularly
forthright commentary to this effect. He begins by asking, “If the produc-
tion and dissemination of knowledge constitute the central mission of a
modern university, then how is free speech related to that mission? Is free
speech a pleasant (or unpleasant) add-on that we could easily remove
without doing any real damage to the institutional integrity of the univer-
sity itself?”His answer is, “I think not.” “If we were to sacrifice free speech
on college campuses, we would be subverting the core values and very
purpose of a modern university . . . free speech is bred into the bones
of amodern university, and any institution that sets those principles aside
can no longer be meaningfully regarded as a proper institution of higher
education.”18 These claims about what makes a bona fide university are
not an idle theoretical conjecture. Part of the motivation for defending
this vision of the university, by the authors I have been citing and others,
is to justify opposition to universities limiting various forms of campus
speech that have no direct connection to teaching and research. Consider,
for instance, the campaign by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Ed-
ucation (FIRE) to highlight and criticize “disinvitation incidents” on US
college campuses. Among the hundreds of incidents cataloged on FIRE’s
database, only a handful were occasions directly linked to teaching and re-
search work organized by faculty. In the vastmajority of cases, the speaking
events were commencement addresses or campus speeches that ostensibly
functioned as extracurricular entertainment, and the speakers being17. Chemerinsky and Gillman, Free Speech on Campus, 76–77.
18. Whittington, Speak Freely, 28–29.
296 Ethics April 2020challenged or silenced were not scholars but political figures, pundits, and
entertainers.19 These kinds of disinvitations have no immediate impact on
the ability of academics to teach and research, or on students to attend
class, study, and take exams. And yet there has been, and continues to
be, anenormous amountof soul-searchingandhand-wringing about such in-
cidents and what they portend for the future of higher education. The
standard view is what intellectually underwrites this angst. If the mainte-
nance of a free speech zone and free speech culture on campus is a vital
part of what makes a university a proper university—as authors like Che-
merinsky, Gillman, and Whittington suggest—then the cancellation of a
talk byKenHamor a gig byActionBronsonmay indeedbe a cause for con-
cern.20 But if that view is mistaken, then incidents like these seem like
storms in teacups.B. Illustrating the Conflict: Ben Stein at the University of Vermont
Why might one resist the standard view, then? Why hold that, contrary to
the recommendations of this view, academic standards sometimes can be
extended out and used to regulate speech outside of formal academic set-
tings? Whymight someone, who regards free speech as an important civil
liberty, nevertheless push back against the idea that it is integral to the
university’smission to sustain a free speech zone and a free speech culture
on campus?
It is useful to bring an example to bear in reflecting on these ques-
tions. In 2009, the writer, actor, and lawyer Ben Stein had been invited to
deliver a commencement address at the University of Vermont (UVM).
After this invitation was publicized, there was a concerted letter-writing
campaign—involving not only faculty at UVM but also high-profile aca-
demic figures elsewhere, including Richard Dawkins and P. Z. Myers—
aimed at persuading UVM’s president, Daniel Fogel, to rescind Stein’s
invitation. Themain concernmotivating this outcry was that Stein had den-
igrated the integrity of the scientific academy and been an outspoken ad-
vocate of intelligent design creationism.21 Myers, one of the main agitators
in this episode, expressed his sentiments about Stein’s invitation in a post19. For a full list of disinvitation incidents dating back to 1998—with a total of 432
incidents cataloged, as of September 2019—see FIRE’s online database at www.thefire
.org/how-to-use-the-disinvitation-database/.
20. Ken Ham is a young earth creationist and religious activist. Action Bronson is a
rapper with a reputation for misogyny and homophobia. They were the targeted speakers




21. For an account of the case, see “Ben Stein Backs Out of Commencement Gig at
Vermont over Views on Evolution,” Chronicle of Higher Education, February 3, 2009, www
.chronicle.com/article/Ben-Stein-Backs-Out-of/42353.
Simpson Academic Freedom and Free Speech 297addressed to UVM’s students: “I don’t know what the administrators at
your school were thinking; this is a man with no qualifications other than
a droningmonotone and a stint on a game show. It’s an expression of pro-
found disrespect. . . . And I’m really sorry for the biology department at
UVM—it’s a real slap in the face for the university to drag in this disgrace
who has been a figurehead for a movement that is trying to replace sci-
ence with superstition.”22 On Fogel’s account of the matter, Stein volun-
tarily withdrew from the talk after Fogel raised the concerns that had been
conveyed to him in the wake of the invitation.23 In an interview with the
university’s student newspaper, Fogel explained his take on the issue as
follows: “The fundamental concern of the people that wrote to me was
that, while they are quite open to having a speaker with Mr. Stein’s views
on campus, they felt that he should not be honored at the commence-
ment ceremony when so many of his views seemed to be affronts to the
basic premises of the academy, about scientific and scholarly inquiry.”24
Stein’s address would have fallen squarely in the university’s free speech
zone, rather than its professional zone, as Chemerinsky andGillmanmean
those terms to apply. It would have been, to borrowWhittington’s phrases,
part of the chaos and freewheeling debate of public democratic argument,
rather than the decorum of the seminar room. Nevertheless, at the urging
of other academics in his own institution and beyond, Fogel treated this as
a moment to be governed by something more like academic standards—
which allow ideas to be marginalized because of their dubious content—
and not by free speech norms, on which dubious content is entitled to a
full hearing and is to be answered with counterspeech instead of being
muzzled. Of course, academic standards are not exacting simply for the
sake of being exacting. The university’s mission is to discover and dissem-
inate knowledge of a kind that is only realizable via the regimentedmeth-
ods of inquiry that operate in mature academic disciplines. And part of
how we fulfill this mission is by empowering academic experts to amplify
or suppress viewpoints, based on a substantive appraisal of their merit rel-
ative to disciplinary standards.25 In the Stein incident, even though the22. P. Z. Myers, “The University of Vermont Makes an Embarrassing Decision,” Pha-
ryngula, January 30, 2009, freethoughtblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/01/30/university-of
-vermont-makes-an/.
23. Fogel’s official statement can be viewed at http://straightfromthesource.files
.wordpress.com/2009/02/campus-communication-commencement-speaker1.pdf.
24. See “UVM’s President Responds to Questions about Commencement Speaker
Ben Stein,” Vermont Cynic, February 2, 2009, https://straightfromthesource.wordpress
.com/2009/02/02/uvms-president-responds-to-questions-about-commencement-speaker
-ben-stein/.
25. If we take promoting knowledge to be the point of academic freedom, does this
commit us to a full-blooded enlightenment confidence about the academy’s ability to dis-
cover objective, “capital-T” Truth? Not necessarily. John Dewey espoused a principle of
academic freedom practically very similar to Post’s, but without recanting his pragmatist
doubts about the discoverability of capital-T Truth. How did Dewey square this circle? He
298 Ethics April 2020occasionwas only a commencement address, as opposed to a formal teach-
ing or research event, UVM opted—to the disquiet of free speech advo-
cates—to give priority to, and try to further the realization of, its epistemic
mission, instead of setting up a platform for the airing of Stein’s hetero-
dox, outsider-ish opinions.26
Granted, the disinvitation of Stein probably did not advance the
university’s intellectual mission in any immediate, straightforward way.
The research of UVM’s biology professors and the learning outcomes for
its students would not have tangibly suffered if Stein had spoken, one pre-
sumes. But it makes sense to adopt a broader perspective on the causal dy-
namics that are in play, in thinking about when and why communicative
platforms in academic communities are either strictly moderated or
openedup.Consider:would research inbiological scienceat largebeheld
back if, once a year, a random barstool pontificator got to air his opinions
on evolution inNature? Would the education of a university’s biology stu-
dents be hurt if, every now and then, the lectern was given over to a young
earth creationist for a few minutes? Not according to the short-term, narrow-
scope counterfactual logic that these questions are implicitly premised
upon.Butwe allow these communicativeplatforms tobe strictlymoderated,
in a way that results in the near-total exclusion of epistemically dubious
views, in part because we believe that the purposes of biological science are
more effectively advanced, over the long-term, by our taking such an26. For a discussion of how Post’s account of academic freedom may be adapted to
formulate a liberal argument for certain instances of “no platforming” in universities, see
Robert Mark Simpson and Amia Srinivasan, “No Platforming,” in Lackey, Academic Freedom,
186–209. Post himself proposes an application of his account to this end in Robert C. Post,
“There is No First Amendment Right to Speak on a College Campus,” Vox, December 31,
2017, www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college
-campuses-milo-spencer-protests. Broadly similar ideas are developed in Sarah Conly, “When
Free Speech Is False Speech,” in Downs and Surprenant, Value and Limits of Academic
Speech, 299–310.
did not believe that the unattainability of objective Truth made academic freedom point-
less. On the contrary, he thought that it made academic freedom necessary. His view—para-
phrased by Menand (see “Limits of Academic Freedom,” 13)—was that “we don’t need
universities in order to preserve a static knowledge from the forces of change” but rather
“to insure that knowledge will not remain static in the service of some vested interest.” Rich-
ard Rorty takes another route to a similar destination. Academic freedom is there to aid the
pursuit of knowledge, but whether we conceive of knowledge as (i) the apprehension of
mind-independent reality or (ii) the widest possible intersubjective agreement on some topic
is merely an ornamental gloss, which reflects the hopes and anxieties that we are gripped by
in reflecting on our practices of inquiry; see Richard Rorty, “Does Academic Freedom Have
PhilosophicalPresuppositions?,”inMenand,FutureofAcademicFreedom,21–42.Whateveronemakes
of that characteristically arch suggestion, it indicates a way in which a skeptic about objective
Truthcanstill signontoatheory of academic freedomwhich is grounded in the aimof promot-
ing knowledge.
Simpson Academic Freedom and Free Speech 299approach. Research and education in this field work better if academically
credentialed biologists have certain communicative spaces and platforms
within which the epistemic standards that define their discipline are strin-
gent regulative ideals. Among other things, this approach means that the
experts’ intellectual energies are not being constantly taxed by their having
to answer the complaints of people who do not recognize their expertise,
or value the knowledge that it generates. The setup embeds a formof rule
consequentialism, if you like. Biologists suppress ignorant and specious
ideas within various formal academic settings because they do better at
achieving their epistemic aims by having contexts where they know they
can postpone some of the tasks involved in the pursuit of those aims, for
example, trying to defend the whole enterprise against fanatical opponents.
The standards governing those spaces shouldn’t, and at any rate couldn’t, be
applied to all public discourse on the relevant topics. But they can—and
for the sake of our epistemic aims, it is not absurd to think they should—
be broadly applied in the institutional home of the professionals responsi-
ble for achieving those epistemic aims, and who are the custodians of those
standards.
To say all this—and to claim, in light of this, that it is perfectly in
line with a proper understanding of the mission of a university to cancel
a talk by someone like Ben Stein, based on an appraisal of his views as ig-
norant, badly reasoned guff—is not yet to disagree with Donald Downs
and Chris Surprenant’s statement, in the introduction to a recent collec-
tion of essays on academic freedom, that the healthy university is a kind
of intellectual polis.27 The crucial question is, what sort of intellectual po-
lis is the university supposed to be? The picture that I am recommending
is one in which the communicative climate of the campus at large is char-
acterized by similar kinds of rigor, thoughtfulness, and deference to aca-
demic expertise to those of the lecture theater or faculty research seminar.
People are expected to comport themselves in a way that befits their being
participants in a serious project of collective inquiry, and—as is already
the case in formal teaching and research settings—this imposes standards
on how they communicate with each other and, in various ways, on the ac-
tual substance of what they communicate. People like Stein who have re-
peatedly demonstrated a conspiratorial hostility to those standards, or who
have otherwise revealed themselves to be unwilling to abide by them, are
not handed valuable speaking platforms. The university is still a place for
vigorous debate and disagreement. But the style and temper of disagree-
ment are quite unlike debate in public discourse, not just in the sense of27. Donald Alexander Downs and Chris W. Surprenant, introduction to Downs and
Surprenant, Value and Limits of Academic Speech, 1–20, 2.
300 Ethics April 2020being more mannerly but in the sense of being more earnest about the
actual aims of inquiry, and hence rising above mere altercation.28
Notice that something like this rival vision of the university can also
be invoked in defense of university “civility codes.” Most of us—includ-
ing proponents of the standard view—agree that lectures and seminars
should not straightforwardly mirror “the chaos of public political dis-
course.” The university’s educative aims will be stymied if students are
too intimidated, or too caught up in the melodrama of political skirmish-
ing, to engage with the more demanding elements of their studies. Once
all the controversial terminological packaging is bracketed off (e.g., in
terms of claims about microaggressions or linguistic violence), the stron-
gest case for university civility codes rests on a similar rationale, grounded
in a commitment to the university’s educational obligations. Students are
on campus to learn. Some academics will expose students to distressing
material as part of their learning. That kind of distress is an integral part
of being a university student. But distress which results from being gratu-
itously attacked or insulted by one’s peers is out of place on the campus
common, for much the same reason that it is out of place in the seminar
room itself. It is a kind of distress which is not integral to the targeted in-
dividual’s learning experience, and which can greatly detract from it.2928. One might question whether protection for extramural speech, as an element of
academic freedom, would be warranted according to this picture. After all, it is sometimes
academics who fail to behave like participants in a serious project of inquiry, e.g., by engag-
ing in mobbing behavior, or engaging in puerile attacks on their rivals on social media. If
the point of academic freedom is to help the university achieve its epistemic purposes, why
extend protection to such unprofessional conduct? The question is a reasonable one, but I
believe that under my proposed view of the relation between free speech and academic
freedom, the rationale for protecting extramural speech looks much the same as under
an orthodox theory of academic freedom. Protection for extramural speech has never
been premised on the thesis that academics reliably carry over their more high-minded in-
tellectual standards into commentary on political issues in public forums. Rather, for bet-
ter or worse, it is premised on the idea that “the intervention of university authorities . . . in
these circumstances creates an atmosphere of distrust between university administrators
and academic staff, which makes it harder for the latter to teach and research freely”;
Barendt, Academic Freedom and the Law, 274. (For his part, Barendt is unpersuaded by this
argument; ibid., 275–77. For a defense of this sort of argument, see Finkin and Post, For the
Common Good, 139–40.) In short, if there is a good case for protecting extramural speech, it
rests on the contention that such protection conduces to a realization of the same episte-
mic aims for whose sake formal teaching and research practices are also protected.
29. Recent examples of analyses incorporating something like this rationale include
Mary Kate McGowan, “On Political Correctness, Microaggressions, and Silencing in the
Academy,” in Lackey, Academic Freedom, 135–47; Christina Easton, “‘Words that Wound’ in
the Classroom: Should They Be Silenced or Discussed?,” in Downs and Surprenant, Value
and Limits of Academic Speech, 167–86. Influential earlier discussions that are premised on
this kind of rationale include Charles Lawrence III, “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist SpeechonCampus,”Duke Law Journal 1990 (1990): 431–83; AndrewAltman, “Liberalism
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There are two compelling lines of argument in defense of the standard
view—and by extension, against this rival perspective that I am propos-
ing—which I will examine in detail in Sections III and IV. But before
turning to those, in the final part of this section I briefly remark on a few
argumentative false starts that one may try out, in replying to the case
sketched above.
First, one might claim that the university’s broader culture does not
affect teaching and research, and hence that the challenge I have pre-
sented for the standard view rests on a false premise. But this won’t do.
Advocates of the standard view generally want to say that institutional cul-
tures are vital to the realization of the university’s intellectual mission—
and that this speaks in the standard view’s favor. For example, Robert
Zimmer argues for the importance of free speech on campus, insofar as
it helps to sustain a spirit of “open, rigorous, intense inquiry, in an environ-
ment of maximal intellectual freedom.”30 In short, the case for or against
the standard view does not hinge on whether the realization of the uni-
versity’s intellectual mission is affected by its institutional culture. Every-
one, or nearly everyone, agrees that it is. The debate is over what kind of
institutional culture best serves the university’s mission.
Second, one might allow that the regulation of communicative ac-
tivities in universities to further their epistemic aims is justifiable in prin-
ciple, while arguing that the disinvitation of controversial speakers—and
similar content-based interventions in campus discourse—is a dispropor-
tionatemeans to take in pursuing this end. But this begs the question.We
do not see it as disproportionate when academics exclude views like Ben
Stein’s from research symposia and textbooks. In other public institu-
tions whose aims include certain forms of inquiry, like public newsmedia,
we do not regard it as excessively censorious if producers decide not to al-
locate airtime to views which they judge to be specious or badly informed.
The disinvitation of a speaker like Stein, in the UVM case, would only
strike us as a disproportionate means if we had already concluded that
the ideals that are native to the free speech zone should take precedence
when a speaking platform is offered to someone who would normally be
marginalized by the intellectual standards of the academy. But that is
exactly the point at issue.30. See Robert J. Zimmer, “What Is Academic Freedom For?,” in Bilgrami and Cole,
Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom?, 239–46, 245.
and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical Examination,” Ethics 103 (1993): 302–17. Granted,
eachof these authorswould resist the suggestion that thenegative effects of being targetedwith
hostile speech on campus are merely distressing. While I am not discounting anyone’s argu-
ment to that effect, the rationale for campus civility codes that I have outlined above will apply
even where the negative effects in question are mere distress.
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campus because it is essential to the educational part of a university’s mis-
sion. In its absence students become inhibited reasoners and stunted
learners. The underlying concern here is important. If a university turns
into an authoritarian fiefdom, with faculty persecuting students for be-
lieving “heretical” ideas, then its educational aims are dashed. But the
view that I am putting forward—in short, on-campus discourse at large
being governed by the norms of rigor and accountability to intellectual
standards that apply in overtly academic settings—is one on which these
things would equally be seen as a failure. As anyone who has been part of
a healthy academic community can attest, the proper exercise of aca-
demic authority is not authoritarian. It brooks appropriately expressed
dissent (and tries to answer it with evidence and arguments). It values het-
erodox opinion (if it is defensible relative to the intellectual standards
that define the relevant field of study).
Now, it is true that some academics do have authoritarian tenden-
cies. Some academics pressure their students into adopting predeter-
mined views on issues where, according to the relevant disciplinary stan-
dards, there is room for reasonable, informed disagreement. This is lousy
pedagogy at best, and professional malpractice in extreme cases. And it is
not necessarily protected by academic freedom, since, as previously dis-
cussed, the academic’s special freedoms and prerogatives are, in princi-
ple and in practice, subject to professional standards and quality controls.
Negligently doctrinaire teaching should be liable to disciplinary push-
back within the university’s professional zone as things already stand, and
the quasi-authoritarian behaviors that characterize such teaching would
be equally liable to disciplinary action if the university’s professional zone
extended to govern communicative spaces across the whole campus. In
sum,wedonot need to invokeprinciples of free speech inorder to explain
why it is seriously wrong to suppress the independent thinking of students
in a way that inhibits their learning.
Academics have good reasons for restricting ignorant, specious, or
otherwise incompetent speech in formal academic communicative spaces,
with a view to better realizing the epistemic purposes for whose sake ac-
ademic communities of inquiry exist in the first place. That is relatively
uncontroversial. But these reasons are also, prima facie, good reasons
for the restriction of ignorant, specious, or otherwise incompetent speech
in informal academic communicative settings, for example, commence-
ment addresses or university-sponsored student society talks. Academic
freedom clashes with free speech in academic settings, and if we under-
stand ‘academic settings’ as encompassing thewider institutional environ-
ment in which teaching and research are conducted, then this poses a se-
rious challenge to the standard view.
The most common argument for the standard view—and the natu-
ral way to address this challenge—appeals to epistemic goods: protecting
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tion on campus, furthers the same core epistemic ends as academic teach-
ing and research. An alternative—but inprinciple complementary—argu-
ment appeals to democratic values. It says we should protect free speech
on campus in order to further certain democratic ends. I discuss these
two arguments in Sections III and IV, respectively.
III. THE EPISTEMIC CASE FOR FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
Disciplines of inquiry have one eye on the future. They seek to advance
our achievements in the spheres of knowledge and understanding that
they are organized around. They try to make it possible for people to
know and understand more than is knowable and understandable now.
They also have one eye on the past. They try to preserve a comprehensive
record of the evidence, insights, and other factors that led people to see
certain theories and conclusions as themost credible things to believe vis-
à-vis the questions they speak to. And crucially, this preservation is meant
to be something more than purely archiving. Advanced students in a ma-
ture academic discipline are not simply taught to recite an inanimate
script which describes why theory a was superseded by theory b. They
are tutored toward a vivid and vital understanding of theory b’s intellec-
tual merits over its predecessors and, more broadly, of how the questions
to which it speaks relate to a range of other questions which jointly con-
stitute a field of study.
It is not surprising, given all this, that Mill’s arguments in On Liberty
are routinely cited in discussions of academic freedom. Mill wants us to
improve our current best understanding of the world. And where it is un-
clear whether our understanding in some area stands to be improved, he
wants us to remain apprised of the reasons why the accepted views in that
area are accepted and to apprehend all this in a way that ensures that we
have living truth instead of “dead dogma.”Mill believes that little else can
serve these epistemic purposes as effectively as us hearing the accepted
view on some issue being criticized by an informed and intellectually ca-
pable person who rejects it. His thesis is ostensibly a psychological one.
You will not fully see what tells in favor of an idea until you have viewed
it through theeyesof a credible interlocutor for whomit is notmerely ahy-
pothetical conjecture but part of their actual, living belief system. That
empathic co-seeing might lead you to regard your current view of themat-
ter in question as false, or incomplete, or simplistic. Or it might give you
an enriched understanding of why your view is indeed the right thing to
believe.31 If something like this picture is right, then it is crucial—for the31. This is a very brief sketch of the themes developed in chap. 2 of Mill, On Liberty.
304 Ethics April 2020fulfillment of their epistemic aims—that communities of inquiry are set
up in a way that prevents the dogmatic silencing of heterodox ideas.
For advocates of the standard view, though, the question is how the
setting up of free speech zones on a university campus helps to achieve
this end. Chemerinsky and Gillman say that academic freedom is not
enough to sustain an antidogmatic research culture; “that requires a sec-
ond component as well: a willingness within the broader campus com-
munity to embrace and defend the unfettered exchange of ideas.”32 But
again, how is this aided by relaxing academic standards and embracing
the undiscriminating, content-neutral ethos which is essential to free
speech, when we shift from the seminar room to the wider campus?
Chemerinsky and Gillman’s answer is that free speech is beneficial
in “nurturing a spirit of tolerance within the broader campus community
that allows all ideas to be subjected to debate and assessment.”33 They
claim that “the success of academic communities depends as much on
continually reinvigorating this sentiment”—the sentiment that wrong-
headed views are to be debated—as on having formal protections for ac-
ademic freedom.34
There is something obviously right in this argument, but also some-
thing that is in need of further justification. The success of academic
communities depends on them having a spirit of tolerance. As long as it
is stated with a few careful caveats, that is true and important. The key ca-
veat is that academic communities should not adopt an uncritical or mol-
lifying stance toward work that manifests subject-relevant ignorance or
methodological incompetence, relative to the appropriate disciplinary
standards. However, when it comes to work that doesmeet these disciplin-
ary standards, academic communities must evince a spirit of tolerance, al-
lowing a platform for that work to be debated, whatever the substance of
its conclusions.
That is the obviously right bit. What stands in need of further justi-
fication is the claim that the cultivation of this ethos in academic disci-
plines is aided by nesting the disciplines in an “anything-goes” free speech
climate. Let’s return to the Stein example to get a fuller sense of the
doubts that one might have about this. Consider: how would allowing
Stein to speak on campus help to foster a spirit of tolerance in the fields32. Chemerinsky and Gillman, Free Speech on Campus, 69.
33. Ibid., 65.
34. Ibid., 70. Notice that Chemerinsky and Gillman’s argument on this front bears a
resemblance to the argument for broader principles of free speech put forward in Lee C.
Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1986). In both cases, a pivotal premise in the argument is that the
community at large will somehow imbibe a tolerant spirit, as a result of it observing how
authorities who have the power to restrict speech—including some speech that they have
pro tanto good reasons to restrict—nevertheless conspicuously refrain from exercising that
power.
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study? At one level this is simply a request for specification. What is the
mechanism supposed to be? Do we imagine that some academics with
dogmatic tendencies hear Stein’s address, or learn that he has been given
a platform, and—having inferred that their institution is paying symbolic
homage to an ethos of tolerance—resolve to be less dogmatic in how they
engage with new ideas in their field? Or do we imagine, a bit more char-
itably, that this is a slow-burn transformation? Perhaps, at universities that
regularly open speaking platforms to shills and trolls, academics—and
their eventual successors, now starting out as students—gradually inter-
nalize the institution’s “hear-them-out” attitude.
It is not absurd to postulate such mechanisms. But insofar as our
method is speculative armchair sociology, we can just as easily posit rival
hypotheses which would cast doubt on the standard view. At universities
thatofferspeakingplatformstoshillsandtrolls,academicsmaybecomedis-
enchanted about the administrationpandering to special-interest groups,
or to the appetites of a student body more interested in debate as theatri-
cal quarreling than debate as serious inquiry and analysis. Theymight jad-
edly come to believe that the management’s attempts to cultivate a toler-
ant ethos are little more than a flimsy, post hoc pretext for hosting “edgy”
events thatmake the institutionmoremarketable to prospective students.
There is another reason to doubt that nesting academic disciplines
in a campus-wide free speech zone aids in the cultivation of a tolerant
ethos in academic study. Academic disciplines are run by people who are
already acculturated into an ethos of tolerance, one which is grounded
in the procedurally defined intellectual standards of the discipline they
are trained in. The biology professors at UVM, where Stein was invited,
hold their posts only by virtue of having internalized their discipline’s
principles and standards, relating to how evidence is cited and how the
strength of one’s conclusions is to be apportioned to the quality of the
supporting evidence. They have an ongoing professional investment in
the notion that hypotheses should only be assessed on the quality of rea-
sons that can be enlisted in their support, andnot on the basis of how they
align with prevailing opinion. It is difficult to see the benefit in a univer-
sity giving a platform to a figure like Stein as a symbolic gesture—one that
is ambiguous at best—in order to nurture an ethos among its academics
which is already present.
Even if we grant that this gesture may have a positive impact, it does
not follow that the type of tolerance that the gesture aims to engender is
appropriate vis-à-vis the university’s epistemic purposes. It is helpful here
to differentiate two different spirits of tolerance and, correspondingly,
two views about how a spirit of tolerancemay be fostered. One straightfor-
ward way to try to transition from dogmatism to tolerance, in a commu-
nicative arena, is to let every idea be heard. But part of what characterizes
an academic community, as a special kind of communicative arena, is that
306 Ethics April 2020it seeks to overcome the hazards of dogmatism in a different way—one
that is harder to institute, but which has corresponding benefits. Aca-
demic communities aim to overcome dogmatism via methodological dis-
cipline. There are other things that characterize academic disciplines, in-
cluding the valuing of technical virtuosity and innovation in the study of
their subjects. But in addition to these typifying traits, part of what con-
stitutes a field of study as an academic discipline is that it establishesmeth-
odological standards as regulative ideals for its work, while viewing these
standards themselves as part of the discipline’s proper sphere of inquiry.
In essence, an academic discipline has standards for assessing the quality
of claims and arguments, as well as a meta-methodological concern with
the critical examination of those same standards.35 In a well-administered
discipline, themethodological standards are implemented via institutional
practices like anonymous review, external examination, and other anticor-
ruption measures. These are all ways of trying to ensure that in the assess-
ment of work—both in the evaluation of research by scholars and, where
applicable, in the assessment of student learning—the discipline’s meth-
odological standards are the primary basis for assessments of quality and
that the influence of other factors is cabined or minimized.
The point, to put it another way, is that academic disciplines have
their own distinctive approach to cultivating and enacting a tolerant, anti-
dogmatic intellectual ethos. Granted, this approach is not tolerant to the
same degree as a laissez-faire bazaar, which welcomes the airing of ideas
and arguments regardless of either their substantive conclusions or the
methodological competence that they manifest. But still, this seems like
a fitting way to implement an antidogmatic ethos in an institution whose
raison d’être is the pursuit of knowledge and inquiry. The success of aca-
demic communities depends on them being willing to hear and consider
any subject-relevant idea or viewpoint, but with the caveat that they should
not adopt an uncritical stance toward work which demonstrates igno-
rance or incompetence relative to the local disciplinary standards. That
is the distinctive mode of tolerance that universities need to be continu-
ally reinvigorating among their teachers and researchers. The gesture of
opening up a platform to a speaker like Stein does not merely fail to rein-
vigorate the ethos in question; it positively subverts it—recall Myers’s re-
mark about this being a slap in the face.
One might object that my reasoning exhibits too much faith in the
willingness and ability of academics to live up to the regulative ideals of35. Stefan Collini argues that this meta-methodological concern is important not only
for disciplinary research but also for giving a university education its distinctive character.
One difference between university education andmere professional training, he says, is that
the former “relativizes and constantly calls into question the information which training
simply transmits”; see Stefan Collini,What Are Universities For? (London: Penguin, 2012), 56.
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and questioning past assumptions,” as Chemerinsky and Gillman say, “the
pressure to conform to dominant opinion is an ever-present threat.”36
And being professionally invested in a set of high-minded methodologi-
cal standards does not prevent academics from being biased or dogmatic
in their appraisal of people’s work. Academics are human beings, and
they are prone to a range of human vices that compromise any ethos of
tolerance that they might be professionally invested in. The point of hav-
ing a free speech zone in universities, then, so onemight argue, is to work
against these vices, in cases where academic communities are becoming
degraded and falling into closed-minded sectarianism.
Again, though, as reasonable as the desideratum is, it is not obvious
how a free speech zone in universities is meant to secure it. Consider an
example. Suppose you believe that neoclassical economics is a faulty
framework for trying to understand how economies really work, one
which is premised on a suite of tendentious assumptions, and whose pre-
eminence in the economics departments of modern universities owes to
its usefulness in legitimizing a global economic order that is favored by
the wealthy. Given that view, and given the prevalence of neoclassical eco-
nomics as a methodological framework, you might think that in (many)
universities a wing of the academic community has abandoned serious
disciplinarity and turned itself into a closed-minded, self-perpetuating
sect. Now, in most of those universities there are large swathes of the stu-
dent body—and many academics outside the economics department—
who feel similarly. In most of those universities there are Marxist student
organizations, which prosecute the case against neoclassical economics
as a part of their activist work. The maintenance of a free speech zone
on university campuses ensures that these dissident perspectives can be
freely propounded. And none of it makes any appreciable dent in the po-
sition of neoclassical economics in the modern academy. The practition-
ers of neoclassical economics in the Faculty of Economics have heard the
objectionsmany times before andhave such a huge argumentative advan-
tage—in terms of knowledge and technical prowess—that their confi-
dence in their framework’s integrity is immune to being shaken by dis-
senters. Even students in the economics department, once they have
progressed past their introductory coursework, may have a marked argu-
mentative advantage (compared with the anticapitalist rabble-rousers in36. Chemerinsky and Gillman, Free Speech on Campus, 70. Jason Brennan makes a sim-
ilar point. Against the claim that universities are full of “disinterested, truth-seeking aca-
demics,” he argues that academia is actually “full of ideologically motivated team players,
status seekers, activists, and political hooligans”; see Jason Brennan, “Outside Funding to
Centers: A Challenge to Institutional Mission?,” in Downs and Surprenant, Value and Limits
of Academic Speech, 96–114, 110–11.
308 Ethics April 2020the Marxist Society) which makes them difficult to “convert.” Indeed, vis-
ible dissent in the free speech zonemay, in this case, be as likely to cement
the controversial disciplinary creed as to dislodge it, since it exposes a so-
ciological dynamic in which the credentialed experts all believe that neo-
classical economics is sound, whereas most who oppose it are dilettantes.
This kind of worry generalizes. Academic disciplines are typically
made up of people who share technical skills, esoteric vocabularies, and
a large stock of common knowledge. As a result of this feature, an aca-
demic discipline which begins to conduct itself like a conformist sect is
unlikely to change course simply as a result of its headquarters being lo-
cated in a marketplace of ideas. Its course will be changed if a dissident
cadre of students and, later, emerging scholars establish their disciplinary
credentials, without losing sight of their reformist aspirations, and trans-
form the discipline from within. Now, it may be that this is aided by the
kindofcampusculture thestandardviewrecommends.Perhaps theagents
of change for a degraded academic discipline need to test theirmettle in a
social climate that juxtaposes the rigors of disciplinary training to the
wide-openness of a marketplace of ideas. But this is a slender reed on
which to rest the case for the standard view. (The argument will look less
fragile if we can flesh it out with reference to examples of individuals or
groups who drove epistemically propitious reforms in their disciplines,
and whose willingness and ability to play this role can be traced in some
way to the formative impetus of a campus free speech culture.)
Here is onemore angle to consider with the epistemic argument for
the standard view. Set aside the whole issue of tolerance and dogmatism.
Think of an academic community that is working as it should: plying its
trade in accord with its methodological standards, welcoming a diverse
range of viewpoints that are defensible by the lights of those standards,
not letting its inquiry devolve into excessively politicized quarrels, and—
as a result of all this good practice—contributing to the advance of knowl-
edge in its field. A community like this does not need to be nested inside
a larger campus community with a wide-open marketplace of ideas. It
could function as an autonomous institute, in an office block somewhere,
and carry on workingmuch the same. But perhaps this academic commu-
nity will do an even better job if it is headquartered in an anything-goes
campus with a robust free speech zone. Probably all academic disciplines
have some sources of impetus which nudge their practitioners toward
novelty and “blue-skies” experimentation, and which are internal to their
own practices. But maybe a scholar is given more and better kinds of im-
petus of this kind by working in a special institutional setting—one
where, while walking from her office to the lecture theater, she crosses
paths with anarchists, art punks, religious zealots, future billionaires,
and loopy eccentrics? Dewey spoke of universities as experiment stations,
and Whittington—echoing this sentiment—claims that universities have
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turbing, and the unorthodox.”37 Maybe being in such an environment is
part of what emboldens academics not only to tolerate outré ideas but
also to champion them.
This seems like a more promising way to develop an epistemic argu-
ment for the standard view. Why? Because it is premised on a non-absurd
hypothesis about the contribution that the free speech zone can make
toward academic disciplines and their constitutive epistemic aims. Cru-
cially, on this view, the contributions of the free speech zone are neither
• unwelcome, because they are in tension with the disciplinary intel-
lectual standards; nor
• redundant, because they encourage an ethos already embedded
in those standards; nor
• futile, because they are bound to be viewed as amateurish relative
to those standards.
It is a hypothesis. Before it can be turned into a good argument, a few
complicating factors must be considered. First, it may be that some dis-
ciplines benefit from being immersed in a free speech zone while others
are undermined. Second, much of the creative impetus that comes with
being located in a campus might just owe to academics encountering
practitioners in other fields and their alternative ways of doing things.
If so, then what we are considering is an argument not so much for the
standard view as for opening up spaces for better cross-disciplinary inter-
action. Third, as Kevin Zollman’s research shows, we can start with a few
plausible assumptions about the motivations and practices of research-
ers and from them derive a number of surprising conclusions about what
kind of communal structures of inquiry best conduce to the realization
of our collective epistemic aims. Communities of inquiry work in weird
ways.38 Our intuitive guesses about what kinds of institutional and37. Whittington, Speak Freely, 55. The quote from Dewey comes in the same part of
Whittington’s book and is drawn from American Association of University Professors, “Re-
port of the Committee of the American Association University Professors on Academic
Freedom and Academic Tenure,” School and Society 3 (1916): 109.
38. For example, suppose that a research community is interested in a promising hy-
pothesis, H2, which conflicts with an accepted theory, H1. Suppose that as-yet-undiscovered
evidence would reveal H2’s theoretical superiority to H1. But suppose that certain data are
gathered, by some in the community, which misleadingly suggest that H2 is false. If all re-
searchers in the community have knowledge of everyone else’s data, then the whole com-
munity will be deterred, under these conditions, from researching a superior hypothesis.
But if the community is in a more “siloed” state, then the misleading evidential deterrents
for investigating H2 won’t affect all researchers, and hence the community is more likely to
learn of H2’s merits. With this sort of case in mind, Zollman defends the counterintuitive
thesis that a research community can be more successful in making discoveries if it is in a
communicatively siloed state, where subgroups operate with little knowledge of the results
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are hoping to achieve are to be taken with a grain of salt—or better yet,
refined, tested, reformulated, and so on.
The idea that being surrounded by an “experimental vibe” makes
academics more intellectually daring is a reasonable starting hypothesis,
and one which, if it could be evidentially supported, could be built up
into a good argument for the standard view. But as things stand, the ep-
istemic arguments put forward on behalf of the standard view are at best
incomplete. It is a complex question which conditions conduce to the
realization of the university’s epistemic aims. It may be that the establish-
ment of campus free speech zones is a step in the right direction. But this
is not some a priori truth. To defend the standard view, we first need to
work with some more precise hypotheses, about exactly what role a free
speech zonemightplay in the realizationof the university’s epistemic ends,
and we should take care not to assign a function to the free speech zone
which is in tension with those ends, or else just redundant.
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC CASE FOR FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
Alternatively, a proponent of the standard viewmight argue that we need
to maintain a free speech zone in universities regardless of whether this
furthers the university’s epistemic mission. The university’s purpose is
not only to discover and disseminate knowledge; universities also play a
role in modeling, instilling, and commending a certain kind of demo-
cratic ethos. And they cannot fulfill this part of their mission, one might
argue, unless they play host to a wide-open free speech culture. This ar-
gument would lose whatever prima facie plausibility it has if it said that
the university’s democratizing mission was more important than its epi-
stemic mission. But it needn’t go that far. All it needs to say is that “uni-
versities are critical molders of democratic citizens” and that this is “a
by-product of universities performing their primary mission of educating
students.”39 Zimmer develops this line of argument as follows: “The is-
sues society faces are complex without simple answers. And in general, it39. Whittington, Speak Freely, 18.
of other subgroups; see Kevin J. S. Zollman, “The Communication Structure of Epistemic
Communities,” Philosophy of Science 74 (2007): 574–87. Zollman’s approach, in developing
this argument, involves a combination of statistical and game-theoretic modeling, to pre-
dict the types of research behaviors and outcomes that are likely to follow the establishment
of different kinds of communicative structures in research communities. He uses similar
methods to argue for other similarly counterintuitive theses, e.g., that a “hands-off” regula-
tory approach is less effective, in realizing the aims of inquiry, than one which actively en-
courages the investigation of unpopular hypotheses; see Erich Kummerfeld and Kevin
J. S. Zollman, “Conservativism and the Scientific State of Nature,” British Journal for the Phi-
losophy of Science 67 (2015): 1057–76.
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tioning, and the provision of an umbrella, and in fact safe haven, for
clashing thought and perspectives, that best illuminate societal, scientific,
and humanistic issues. In a world that tries to oversimplify, universities
should demand analysis of inherent complexity . . . in a world that creates
an ‘us-versus-them’ approach to argument, we should support comfort
with divergent views.”40 Notice how, on Zimmer’s account, the job of the
university, in helping society deal with complex issues, is not just to supply
the more complex answers when simple answers won’t do. Its job, rather,
is to inculcate a more enlightened mind-set in the way that we—society
at large—face up to those issues, one that does not retreat into reductive
tribalism or shy away from the complexity, but which instead faces the
complexity with a spirit of sobriety, patience, and respect for one’s argu-
mentative opponents. And the way that academics help with this is not
just by interjecting in debates to say, “Wait, the issues are more complex!”
It is by embodying a vocational role that models and honors serious de-
bate—debate that goes beyond mere altercation—in a way that can then
be held up as an aspirational ideal for all of society.
One would have to hold a very single-minded view of the university’s
purposes to oppose all this. However great the effect might be, it seems
hard to deny that a thriving university sector could play this role in a dem-
ocratic society and that this could be beneficial.
But as with the epistemic argument, the crucial question, vis-à-vis the
implications for the standard view, is why we should think that universi-
ties would do better at this if they embraced a campus-wide free speech
ethos, instead of an ethos in which the communicative atmosphere of
the campus at large is characterized by the same kinds of academic stan-
dards that govern teaching and research. Both Whittington and Zimmer
see the university’s democratizing mission as a part of why free speech is
essential to university life. But the norms and culture of academic free-
dom seem to model the democratic ethos in question better than the
norms and culture of free speech. This is brought out in Michael Lynch’s
account of the justificatory basis of academic freedom—an account which
especially stresses the academy’s role in democratic formation. Teaching
and research in universities cause debates about social issues to be better
informed, they model the justificatory practices of rational inquiry, they
instill critical thinking skills, and, in all these ways, they fortify people’s ca-
pacity to engage in dissent against authorities. These capabilities are vital
to the health of a democratic order, and academic freedom protects the
teaching and research practices that nourish them.4140. Zimmer, “What Is Academic Freedom For?,” 241.
41. Michael P. Lynch, “Academic Freedom and the Politics of Truth,” in Lackey, Aca-
demic Freedom, 23–35.
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good democratic citizens, then universities should be pushing students
to outgrow a simplistic idea of public debate, on which every opinion is
just as entitled to a proper hearing as any other. Universities should be
fostering not only a culture of respect for dissenting opinions but also
a sense that the value of dissent hinges on its being intelligent, coherent,
and evidentially supported. Granted, it may be a condition of democratic
legitimacy that the dissent of an ignorant contrarian is accommodated
on the same terms as the dissent of an informed citizen.42 But a democ-
racy full of ignorant contrarians is in trouble. It is unclear, then, why a
university which is governed by the ideologically open but intellectually
stringent norms of academic discourse will do better, in attaining to its
democratizing purposes, by loosening the standards that govern commu-
nication, once we step outside overtly academic settings and onto the
wider campus.
One prima facie viable answer to this question is that a university
might conceive of the broader campus as a kind of training ground for
the hurly-burly of a wide-open democratic culture. The university might
think that a good way—or indeed, the best way—to facilitate this training
is to allow the campus to be a forum in which students experience the tu-
multuousness of totally unfettered debate.43 Indeed, this “democratic
training wheels” logic could even extend back into the classroom. Maybe
the core epistemic mission of the classroom can be balanced against a
secondary democratic-formation mission, in a way that sometimes justi-
fies the professor in allowing a totally wide-open debate—unconstrained
by considerations of disciplinary standards—even where this temporarily
compromises or undermines the inculcation of knowledge for students
in that setting. Seana Shiffrin suggests something along these lines. She
says that a classroom which has a “full-blown commitment” to free speech
“plays a role in exemplifying, reinforcing, and training citizens in democratic42. This idea—that there is a tight connection between democratic legitimacy and the
robust protection of free speech rights in the public sphere—is part of the broader theo-
retical background for Post’s account of academic freedom in Democracy, Expertise, and Ac-
ademic Freedom. For an innovative elaboration of this type of theory of democratic legitimacy,
see Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016).
43. Post expresses some openness to this kind of argument: “Our universities might
support student-invited speakers because they wish to create a diverse and heterogeneous
campus climate in which students can learn the democratic skills necessary to negotiate a
public sphere filled with alien and cacophonous voices. Universities may wish to educate
students in practices of citizenship by encouraging a wide variety of student groups to in-
vite outside speakers to recreate within the campus a marketplace of ideas”; see Robert C.
Post, “The Classic First Amendment Tradition under Stress: Freedom of Speech and the
University,” in The Free Speech Century, ed. Geoffrey R. Stone and Lee C. Bollinger (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 106–22, 119.
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tatorial classroom”—roughly, one where the professor expects discussion
to attain to formal disciplinary competencies—does not.44 “The former
instils disciplinary expertise within an environment that remains as open
as possible to input from all comers and to criticism. It thereby operates
as a forum and exemplar of democratic legitimating activity, whereas the
dictatorial classroom, however powerful it is at instilling . . . disciplinary
competence . . . is in tension with democratic values.”45 We can quibble
with Shiffrin’s use of the word ‘dictatorial’ to describe a classroom that re-
sists a full-blown commitment to free speech and exhibits the bounded
form of tolerance which is characteristic of academic disciplines. (Recall,
from Sec. II.C, the difference between academic authority and authori-
tarianism.)But even if the phrasing is softened in away that ismore flatter-
ing tomyproposal, thegeneral point remains.Universities canbe thought
of as institutions which, in addition to upholding their epistemic mis-
sion, ought to be training good democratic citizens and facilitating dem-
ocratic legitimating discourse. If we extend the ideologically open but in-
tellectually stringent norms of academic discourse, to cover all speech that
takes place in the university’s orbit, this could make the secondary goals
harder to achieve. Having a free speech culture on the campus at large,
and sometimes in the classroom as well, could help.
But even if we find something appealing in this, it is not enough to
vindicate the standard view’s insistence that universities must prioritize
free speech, or that free speech is somehow a defining ideal for univer-
sities. For one thing, notice that even a university which does not give any
special priority to free speech, and which instead opts to extend themore
stringent communicative norms of academic discourse across the whole
institution, can still be properly understood as working in the service of
an important democratic value. As Post’s account of academic freedom
emphasizes, the university’s core epistemic goals, in research and educa-
tion, are of vital importance in establishing and enriching a society’s dem-
ocratic competence, that is, its collective capacity to render intellectually
adequate and empirically well-informed judgments about the matters of
public concern which government must address.46 For a university to pri-
oritize the furthering of democratic competence—as we might now view
the Stein episode, from Section II—is not to deny the importance of dem-
ocratic legitimation. It is merely to delegate the facilitation of democratic
legitimating discourse to other social institutions.44. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Sincerity and Institutional Values,” in Speech Matters: On
Lying, Morality, and the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 182–223, 213.
45. Ibid., 213.
46. Post, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom, 27–43.
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dard view, we are going to have to claim that such delegation is a derelic-
tion of the university’s duties. Tomake such a claim is to demand not only
that the university take the lead in advancing our collective epistemic
aims, and that it play a role in the formation of a healthy democratic cit-
izenry by furthering our democratic competence, but also that it do all
these things while assisting in the legitimation of our democratic institu-
tions. It is to think of the university as democracy’s Swiss army knife. There
may be good reason for a particular institution to aspire to all this if it be-
lieves that the difficult balancing acts can be carried off. But it seems
rather less plausible to claim that it is a dereliction of duty to temper this
aspiration and to instead cultivate a campus-wide discursive culture that
puts intellectual values first—especially given that those values are them-
selves locatable in a network of democratic ideals. For the advocate of a
democratic argument for the standard view, the key argumentative bur-
den that remains is to explain why universities must be conceived of in
a way that leads to the more onerous assignment of duties. Why should
we think of universities as being obliged to join with other institutions
in facilitating the discursive activities that legitimate democratic govern-
ment? Why couldn’t their contribution to a democratic politics just con-
sist in the improvement of the citizenry’s democratic competence?47 If it
were possible for the university to further all of these democratic desider-
ata simultaneously, with no real downsides, then that would be the issue
settled. But I have tried to give an indication of what some of the down-
sides are, or might be.
Advocates of the standard view might claim that the argumentative
burden is actually the other way around: why shouldn’t we think of uni-
versities as obliged to facilitate democratic legitimating discourse? This47. We get the beginnings of such an argument in Dworkin’s defense of academic
freedom. His proposal resembles a “democratic formation” account, but it puts greater em-
phasis on the liberal ideal of ethical individualism, rather than the democratic ideal of self-
governance. Academic freedom is warranted because it “represents and reinforces the ideal
of ethical individualism . . . by creating a theater in which personal conviction about the
truth and value is all that matters”; see Dworkin, “We Need a New Interpretation,” 190. Note
that the “ethical individualism” invoked here closely resembles the ideal of “moral indepen-
dence” that Dworkin appeals to in explaining the grounds of free speech; see, e.g., Ronald
Dworkin, “Is There a Right to Pornography?,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1981): 177–
212. For Dworkin, then, these twin freedoms—academic freedom and free speech—are
jointly reinforcing ways of sustaining “our society’s support for a culture of independence
and . . . its defense against a culture of conformity”; see Dworkin, “We Need a New Interpre-
tation,” 189. And if these twin freedoms are meant to serve the same ideal of ethical individ-
ualism, then it might be beneficial to have institutions that evince a commitment to both
freedoms, side by side—in which the scholar’s exemplary ethical individualism (protected
by academic freedom) is emulated by students and campus visitors (communicating under
the auspices of free speech).
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the axes I have been grinding here. In Section I, I said that I am not ask-
ing whether we have good reason to accept free speech as a basic civil
liberty, or whether we have good reason to accept academic freedom as
a governing precept in universities. I said that I am asking why—granting
such reasons—we shouldn’t move toward a more “partitioned” view, on
which academic freedom is the governing norm for communication in
universities, and free speech is left to do its work in the wider sphere of
public discourse. The misgiving one might have, in essence, is that this
question just seems unmotivated, or perhaps perversely motivated.
But there is a real and earnest motivation here. In treating the uni-
versity campus as the standard view recommends—as a forum for the co-
existence of the intellectual seriousness of academic study and the rowdy
altercation of wide-open, democratic discourse—we hope that demo-
cratic discourse will be elevated and that academic study won’t be dragged
down. But that may be overly optimistic. The influence might very eas-
ily go the opposite way. Now, anxieties about the dumbing down of the
university’s intellectual culture do not license a retreat into insular, ivory
tower elitism. That would be another (arguably worse) way of forsaking
our epistemic mission. The appropriate response to this anxiety is to work
at improving the quality of discussion that occurs on campus but out-
side of formal academic settings. Even as disciplinary research is becom-
ing increasingly hyperspecialized, there are more academics than ever,
across all corners of the university, who are working at the art of engaging
nonspecialist audiences with their research. The popularity of many ac-
ademic podcasts suggests that there is a significant lay audience with an
appetite for such material. And yet simultaneously, the number of plat-
forms at universities being given over to pseudoeducative pageantry and
vain, sophomoric tub-thumping would seem to be on the rise—or, at least,
not in decline. In such a climate, the university leader or administrator
who consults the professoriate and treats their expertise and intellec-
tual standards as a weighty thumb on the scales, in deciding who receives
access to the university’s communicative platforms, is to be watchfully
applauded.
V. CONCLUSION
I have indicated some shortcomings in the main arguments for the stan-
dard view of the relation between academic freedom and free speech. Pro-
ponents of the standard view believe that, in addition to the protections
afforded to teaching and research, under principles of academic freedom,
other public speech in universities—including commencement addresses,
public lectures, other student society events, campus activism, and writ-
ing in student newspapers—should be protected by general-purpose free
316 Ethics April 2020speechprinciples. They think that free speech is constitutive of the univer-
sity and that “any institution that sets those principles aside can no longer
be meaningfully regarded as a proper institution of higher education.”48
But the epistemic and democratic arguments for that view are unconvinc-
ing. Of course, this does not entail that the standard view is completely
indefensible. But it awaits a stronger defense.
Until that arrives, there is a natural position to revert to, which is to
say that speech expressing ill-informed or badly reasoned ideas need not
receive any special protection in universities, except if it falls under the
protection of academic freedom, for example, if it occurs as part of the
university’s formal teaching and research activities. Free speech is a fun-
damental liberty in social intercourse per se, but it is not a mandatory
commitment for the university. Thus, we can at least sometimes exclude
or marginalize speakers and ideas that fall short of the intellectual stan-
dards which define academia and conduce to its core epistemic aims.
Does this mean that universities can be run as ideologically repres-
sive dictatorships? No. The university should cultivate debate and open-
mindedness and welcome unorthodox viewpoints. But, to recap one of
my points from Section III, our antidogmatic ideals can be—and in uni-
versities, I have argued, they should be—put into practice in a way that is
more intellectually discriminating than in public discourse per se. Much
like individual academic disciplines, the university at large is not obliged
to sponsor communicative platforms or venues for expression that man-
ifestly fail to attain to its basic intellectual standards (e.g., coherence, evi-
dential backing, disciplinary understanding). Decisions about who meets
this standard should be made in a consistent and relatively transparent
way. But in principle, given that proviso, the imposition of such intellec-
tual standards is nomore ideologically intolerant than a literary publisher
relegating weak manuscripts to the slush pile, or an art gallery choosing
not to exhibit work that is hackneyed or derivative. Universities have a de-
fining epistemic mission, and in the way that they host and manage com-
municative activity they needn’t pretend otherwise.
But what does this mean in practice? What actual policies should a
university adopt, if it rejects the standard view of the relation between ac-
ademic freedom and free speech and opts for the alternative approach
that I am recommending, on which academic standards of discourse gov-
ern all communication that happens under the university’s insignia?
In the wake of the Ben Stein controversy, UVM’s president pledged
to institute a new vetting procedure for the invitation of commencement
speakers, which involved consulting with faculty about all invitees. At a
programmatic level, this is one kind of practical policy approach that
universities should undertake in light of the theoretical stance that I am48. Whittington, Speak Freely, 29.
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decisions about which speakers receive speaking platforms on campus.
Now, when members of faculty themselves invite speakers to contribute
to faculty-run teaching and research, any managerial oversight must re-
main “light touch.”The idea that faculty should be autonomous in decid-
ing how on-campus teaching and research events are run, including who
is invited to speak, follows straightforwardly from a commitment to aca-
demic freedom. But for other kinds of speaking invitations—things like
commencement addresses, or student society meetings, which are not di-
rectly linked to teaching and research—universities should (and note:
some already do) have some kind of academic oversight procedures in
place. These procedures should, subject to sensible provisos, make it pos-
sible for faculty to oppose or block invited speakers on academic grounds.
Some institutions require that invited speakers be vetted by a senior ad-
ministrator. Some institutions require that invited speakers be vetted by
studentrepresentatives.49 Theevidentdefect intheseformsofvetting,how-
ever, is that they sideline academic expertise. If we want academic stan-
dards of discourse to govern all communication that happens under the
university’s umbrella, then the natural way to achieve that is to give faculty
the opportunity to register concerns about the academic credentials of
invitees. And where the considered judgment of the institution’s aca-
demic experts is that an invited speaker’s work manifestly fails to attain
to the kind of intellectual standards that further its epistemic mission,
then, other things being equal, that institution should refrain from offer-
ing a platform to that speaker.
I said that this power should be subject to sensible provisos. For one
thing, it would be unwise to give individual faculty members a veto power
over invitations. Individuals often have idiosyncratic or sectarian views
about what counts as academically competent work. Indeed, some fac-
ulty have doubts about the competence of their peers in adjacent aca-
demic disciplines. The faculty representatives who are tasked with re-
viewing invited speakers ought to be a representative cross section of an49. For example, the University of Essex, in its “External Speaker Code of Practice,”
mandates that invitations to external speakers be reviewed by the university’s safeguarding
compliance manager, who has the power to approve, refuse, or impose a range of proce-
dural conditions and constraints on the relevant event (see www.essex.ac.uk/student
/event/external-speaker). My home institution, University College London, requires that
all student union–affiliated clubs and societies seek prior approval for visiting speakers
from the Students’Union, which, again, can either deny or impose various procedural con-
ditions and constraints on the relevant event. Given that student clubs and societies must
be union affiliated at University College London in order to gain access to most university-
based facilities and funding, this requirement functions as a de facto, student-led vetting
procedure on external speakers for clubs and societies; see studentsunionucl.org/how-to
-guides/organise-event-with-external-speaker.
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tellectual diversity contained therein. And the collective opinion of these
representatives should probably be gauged via some kind of majoritarian
process. The cases where we want to avoid platforming speakers are those
in which many or most members of a representative group of faculty del-
egates would judge that the speaker falls short of the institution’s intel-
lectual standards. There is room for variation in the fine-grained details of
practical implementation, but this is acceptable as long as the processes
remain transparent.
With regard to the various kinds of on-campus speech that primarily
come from students—like writing in student newspapers, or student ac-
tivism—there are, again, existing regulatory frameworks through which
academic oversight can be implemented. Most universities impose regu-
lations upon student newspapers and student activism. These procedures
can either directly or indirectly constrain students’ expressive activities
on and around campus. Academic staff should have some advisory input
in these regulations, then. They shouldn’t be entirely overseen by admin-
istrators. Again, if a university wants academic standards of discourse to
govern all communication that occurs under its umbrella, then it should
seek sensible ways to elicit input from its own academics when it comes to
these sorts of regulations.
Beyond these kinds of programmatic recommendations, trying to
specify a universal policy template for universities to follow is unlikely to
be helpful. Different institutional cultures and management setups call
for different kinds of regulatory practices. And there are a variety of rea-
sonable policy approaches that universities can adopt in relation to these
issues. The overall point of critiquing the standard view—and of argu-
ing for an alternative, on which academic standards apply beyond overt
teaching and research contexts—is not to try to establish some kind of
one-size-fits-all policy recommendation. The key point is to clarify which
ideals universities should be answering to when working through these
policy issues.5050. There are other difficult policy issues to contend with beyond no platforming and
“disinvitation incidents.” Universities will become very dreary if they refuse to host enter-
tainment events. But academic vetting processes will become utterly toothless if events in-
volving the Ben Steins andMilo Yiannopouloses of the world can simply be rebadged as en-
tertainment and thereby exempted from any academic oversight. So how do we distinguish,
in a principled way, between events to which academic standards are applicable and events
that are merely recreational? Here is another problem. On any plausible view of how uni-
versities should be run, students, staff, and visitors shouldn’t be taken to forfeit their ordi-
nary civil rights of speech, movement, and association simply by virtue of setting foot on a
campus. While the university may have good reasons to refrain from supporting some stu-
dent publications or activist groups, this does not entitle it to infringe on any student’s or-
dinary civil liberties. But then how do we distinguish between communicative activities that
occur under the university’s aegis and those that are merely occurring on the university’s
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ideals—then we will be troubled by cases like the Stein episode at UVM,
in which an invited commencement speaker lost a platform because of
his purportedly dismal intellectual track record. At the same time, if we
hold the standard view, we won’t be too troubled by cases in which shills,
trolls, and paranoid conspiracy theorists are given desirable speaking op-
portunities at student society events. While we may not think that these
speakers represent our university’s intellectual ideals, the very essence of
free speech is that such voices are to be answered with more speech, in-
stead of simply being muzzled. By contrast, if we reject the standard view,
our perspective on these cases—and on the array of policy options one
might adopt, in relation to similar cases—looks rather different. Most im-
portantly, instead of the anything-goes permissiveness that is characteris-
tic of a free speech ethos, we will bemore disposed to vet ideas and speak-
ers in advance, and to do that in a way that calls upon the intellectual
expertise and judgment of the institution’s own academic experts. If a
clear majority of faculty representatives believe that inviting some partic-
ularly disreputable speaker to campuswill undermine the intellectualmis-
sion that they are working to achieve, in their teaching and research, this
will generally be a good reason to withhold or withdraw an invitation.
Friends of the standard view have reason to regard this kind of approach
with a suspicious eye. Those who reject the standard view will tend to regard
it as evidence of an institution that takes its epistemic mission seriously.premises? When can the university say, “These are our premises, and we aren’t here to host
this sort of thing,” and when would that shade into despotism? These are policy challenges
for any university, including those that purport to be bastions of free speech. In any case,
again, the point of criticizing the standard view is not to resolve all such issues but to clarify
which ideals universities should be aspiring to in working through such issues.
